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Strategic substitutes or complements? The game of where to fish
Robert L. Hicks, College of William and Mary
William C. Horrace, Syracuse University
Kurt E. Schnier, Georgia State University
Abstract
The ‘‘global game with strategic substitutes and complements’’ of Karp et al. (2007) is used to model the decision
of where to fish. A complete information game is assumed, but the model is generalized to S > 1 sites. In this game,
a fisherman’s payoff depends on fish density in each site and the actions of other fishermen which can lead to
congestion or agglomeration effects. Stable and unstable equilibria are characterized, as well as notions of
equilibrium dominance. The model is applied to the Alaskan flatfish fishery by specifying a strategic interaction
function (response to congestion) that is a non-linear function of the degree of congestion present in a given site.
Results suggest that the interaction function may be non-monotonic in congestion.
1.

Introduction

Understanding congestion externalities is important in many settings but is particularly relevant to natural resource
economics. For example, Timmins and Murdock (2007) consider valuation of recreational sites while taking into
account the effects of congestion on an individual’s preferences over those sites. In the commercial fishing industry,
vessels may respond to congestion in their decision of ‘‘where to fish’’. In other words, vessel captains behave
strategically, and their location decisions are influenced by their interaction with other participants in the fishery.
Vessels may agglomerate to increase safety as nearby vessels respond more quickly to distress signals (safety in
numbers), while severe congestion may decrease safety as fishing gear become tangled. In the former scenario, the
payoff to fishing a site increases with the number of vessels selecting the same site (strategic complements), while in
the latter the payoff decreases with the number of vessels (strategic substitutes). The existence of both of these
strategic responses (complements or substitutes) implies a strategic interaction function that is non-monotonic in
congestion. The purpose of this paper is to specify a complete information game with strategic substitutes and
complements (Karp et al., 2007), to characterize the equilibria that may exist, and to use vessel location data from
the Bering Sea and Aleutian Island (BSAI) flatfish fishery to estimate a flexible interaction function within a random
utility model framework (Bayer and Timmins, 2007; Timmins and Murdock, 2007). Results suggest that a
nonmonotonic interaction function exists in the fishery.
The departure point for models of strategic complements or substitutes is the binary-action game of
complete information (Bulow et al., 1985). If payoffs are monotonically increasing in congestion (strategic
complements), then a unique equilibrium generally exists, while if payoffs are monotonically decreasing in
congestion (strategic substitutes), then multiple equilibria may exist. Complete information holds when players
possess full knowledge of some market signal, and players generally take the action when the market signal is
strong. Karp et al. (2007) extend the binary-action model in interesting ways. First, they allow for an interaction
function that is quasi-concave (non-monotonic) in congestion. That is, a player’s payoff and interaction function are
first increasing then decreasing as more players choose the crowd-inducing action. 1 Also, theirs is a global game in
which each player receives a noisy realization of the market fundamental (market signals are heterogeneous across
players). They find that when the noise is small and the congestion effect is weak, there exists a pure strategy
equilibrium that is monotone in the market signal. That is, as the market signal improves, agents are more likely to
take the action. However, if the congestion effect is strong, strategies are non-monotonic in the market signal. That
is, a better signal may lead to the expectation of greater crowding, causing agents to take the action with lower
probability.
In the context of fishing, we extend the Karp et al. (2007) model to the case where agents select one of
many potential actions (multiple locations where vessels may fish) and where each action has a different market
signal. 2 In commercial fisheries the market signal is the density of fish or expected catch in each location. However,
complete information of the market signal is assumed. (Although this is a strong assumption, it may be reasonable in
1

Karp et al. discuss the binary decision to ‘‘go to a bar’’ or ‘‘stay at home’’, where players have incentives to go to the bar if it has a good crowd
(complements) but is not too crowded (substitutes) and where the market signal is the additively separable quality of the bar. Non-monotonicity
of inter action only exists in the ‘‘go to the bar’’ (crowd-inducing) state.
2
This is analogous to ‘‘multiple bars’’ in the world of Karp et al. (2007).

this case since all commercial fishing vessels are equipped with devices to detect fish and other vessels.) Therefore,
the model is neither a generalization nor a special case of the Karp et al. (2007) model, but the notions of equilibria
are similar. Existence of local equilibria is discussed, and equilibria are characterized (e.g., stable vs. unstable) as are
notions of equilibrium dominance. Consequently, the assumption of quasi-concavity of the interaction function of
Karp et al. (2007) can be relaxed and equilibria are characterized when the interaction function is more generally
non-monotonic. Bayer and Timmins (2005) discuss existence of multiple equilibria when the interaction function is
non-monotonic in congestion. They develop a sorting model of location choice, but their focus is existence of
unique equilibria when the interaction function is monotonic in congestion (in fact, linear). The game presented
here is effectively a sorting model of location choice, but the focus is actual characterization of the equilibria in the
non-monotonic case.
This model also serves as an intellectual framework for estimation of a random utility model with an
interaction function that is non-monotonic in congestion. Bayer and Timmins (2007) develop a random utility
model of site choice in the style of Berry et al. (1995) that is linear (positive or negative) in site congestion. In the
present paper, their procedure is generalized empirically, allowing utility to be a non-monotonic function of
congestion (i.e., the interaction function is non-monotonic). 3 The non-monotonic interaction function and other
model parameters are estimated for a panel of BSAI flatfish vessels. Results indicate that vessels may have a nonmonotonic response to congestion, and that the general shape of the function is a third-order polynomial.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a complete information game with
strategic substitutes and complements and provides a discussion of stable and unstable equilibria, interior,
semi-interior and corner equilibria, and notions of equilibrium dominance. Section 3 contains an empirical analysis
of the BSAI flatfish fishery using the sorting equilibrium model of Bayer and Timmins (2005, 2007). Evidence that
the interaction function in this fishery is non-monotonic in congestion is provided. Section 4 summarizes and
concludes.
2. A Complete Information Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements
The objective is to introduce the issue of how and why agglomeration and congestion effects can be present in
commercial fisheries and to serve as an intellectual framework for the empirical analyses that follow. Our basic setup follows Karp et al. (2007) with the restriction of complete information but generalized for several actions. An
individual is considering which of S actions to take, a ∈ {1, . . . , S}.We couch our discussion in terms of a visit to a
fishing site s = 1, . . . , S and associate the action a = s with ‘‘visiting site s’’. We assume, without loss of generality,
that ‘‘not fishing’’ (staying in port) is not an option. 4 The individual is small and be-haves non-strategically, and the
mass of individuals is 1. The utility that each individual receives from choosing ‘‘visit site s’’ depends
on two factors: an underlying state (fish biomass, expected catch and other site-specific variables), denoted
;
and the fraction (share) of individuals who undertake the action,
The payoff function Us(αs) from
choosing ‘‘visit site s’’ satisfies:

Assumption 1 implies that payoff at location s increases with the underlying state (market signal). Assumption 2
ensures that the derivative of profits is well-defined. It also ensures that there are agglomeration effects (increasing
profits) in any site that contains zero (or very few) vessels. This is not needed in what follows; it is there to ensure
that any vacant site with
has positive probability of a visit. 5 Save for the potential non-monotonicity of the
interaction function, these assumptions are consistent with those maintained in the sorting model of Bayer and
Timmins (2005, p. 465), which form the basis of the empirical model in Section 3. Therefore, the theoretical model
is well-suited to serve as an intellectual framework for the empirical analysis.
2.1 Characterization of Equilibria
Since the profit function is non-monotonic there may be multiple equilibria (Bayer and Timmins, 2007). 6 Let
equilibria be described by the
We now develop basic notions of equilibria and
3

Per (Bayer and Timmins (2005), p. 436), their estimation strategy ‘‘at no point requires a unique equilibrium for estimation purposes’’. Also, it
is the particular form of their likelihood function that determines the final equilibrium among many (Bayer and Timmins, 2007, p. 359).
Therefore, their strategy is well-suited to the purpose at hand.
4
This assumption may be problematic if the goal is to inform conservation policy, where fishing zone closures may lead ‘‘not fishing’’ being
optimal. The goal here is to develop notions of equilibria in this setting and not to inform policy.
5
Ultimately, if a site is not visited, then it is viewed as not contained in the set of actions and is eliminated.
6
A unique equilibrium exists when f (0) ̸= 0 and f is monotonically decreasing.

stability. First, when an equilibrium exists at a point on a payoff function that is increasing in congestion,
we say that in equilibrium the location exhibits an agglomeration effect, otherwise we say it exhibits a congestion
effect. Following Karp et al. (2007), our notion of stability is based on a process of tâtonnement or grouping. When
an individual deviates from the equilibrium action, the effect is negligible because the individual possess zero mass.
However, groups of individuals can affect an equilibrium in the same sense that groups of buyers and sellers in a
Walrasian auction effect equilibrium prices. Logically, groups will only deviate from equilibria into sites exhibiting
agglomeration effects. However, individuals possess complete information (instrumentation to detect the location of
fish and other vessels), so movers may realize that their former (equilibrium) site exhibited congestion effects which
were relieved upon their moving, thus increasing utility for stayers. If the gain in utility for stayers exceeds the gain
in utility for movers, then movers will return to the equilibrium site, so the equilibrium point is considered stable.
The actions of the groups are not coordinated (despite the ‘‘grouping’’ concept), so our notion of stability can
produce equilibria that are suboptimal (coordination failure). Indeed, the previous example implied that both movers
and stayers were made better off by the deviation of movers, yet the movers had an incentive to return, garnering
lower utility for each group. Additionally, since there exists the potential for multiple equilibria, the system may
‘‘get stuck’’ at a low-payoff equilibrium, even though there may exist stable equilibria where all players can be
made better off. In what follows we assume that all locations are fished without loss of generality.

Obviously a stable equilibrium satisfies Definition 1 and does not provide incentives for groups of
individuals to deviate (congestion effects); an unstable equilibrium does (agglomeration effects). Equilibria in this
setting are best understood by examining the relationships between pairs of locations. Therefore, Definition 1
implies that equilibria satisfy for each pair s, j:
Since f is not guaranteed to be a one-to-one mapping,
existence of an equilibrium is that the equation:

is not a function per se. A sufficient condition for

be satisfied with
with
a non-empty, compact subset of [0, 1]. This is simply
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Unfortunately, the sufficient condition is unlikely to hold because Ask will not be
compact in general, so existence in not guaranteed. By Brouwer’s fixed point theorem a sufficient condition for
that ensure an equilibrium
existence of an equilibrium is that be monotonic. 7 We seek conditions on
without resorting to a monotonicity restriction.
To fix ideas en route to a more general result, consider the case where
for all s, j. In this case an
interior equilibrium is guaranteed to exist (trivially) at
, regardless of the nature of the
interaction function, . Therefore, there may be pieces of f around the point
(or elsewhere) that admit an
equilibrium when the differences between the
are not too large. Regardless of the nature of
, the function
is piecewise monotonic. Therefore, consider some monotonic piece of
on subdomain
Call this
monotonic piece with monotonic and one-to-one inverse,
. The image of
under is the compact interval
where
Then the image of

Now consider some compact interval
under

is the compact interval

Continuity and monotonicity on the subdomain
ensure that the function on the RHS of the equation in
Proposition 1is continuous, and the result follows from Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. Since may have several

7

These are precisely the arguments of Bayer and Timmins (2005) who assume f is linear.

monotonic pieces there may be many compact subsets of the unit interval that satisfy Proposition 1. We now attempt
to understand the nature of the interval,
in terms of the model’s parameters.
For Proposition 1 to hold, we see that the outer function
(on the RHS of the equation in
Proposition 1) must map into
through the monotonic portion of
. Therefore its domain must be the
compact set
. Since the condition in Proposition 1 must hold for all locations, it must hold for the kth, so for
the proposition to hold it must be true that
Hence, the relevant subdomain of
must be
contained in the compact set
This last condition must also hold more generally
(for = 1, . . . , S). Let ranked
, and let
Therefore, we have the following
result.

Notice that
will map
into [a, ¯a], while the more general
will map it into a subset of [0, 1]
that contains
This subset will not be compact in general, so a fixed point may not exist in general. By limiting
attention to
, the mapping is one-to-one and continuous. It is also important to note that, thus far,
we have presumed that all the locations, s = 1, . . . , S are fished in equilibrium. The implication for Propositions 1
and 2 is that the locations are similar in their attributes
and, hence, that
is small. Therefore, the set of
interest,
, will be approximately equivalent to
and, hence be contained in
When
for all s, j, then d = 0 and
is some neighborhood around the point
The larger is
, the wider the interval
and the wider the interval [f ∗α, ¯f ∗α] required for some portion of the
interaction function f . The width of the interval
is (in some sense) a proxy for the degree of monotonicity
of , for if is monotonic for all , then
is the image of [0, 1] under . Additionally, the sufficient
condition in Proposition 2 is probably more general than is necessary, since we could have defined some subset
for each location over which a fixed point might exist, but having a general
simplifies the exposition.
2.2 Equilibrium Stability and Dominance
For completeness, this subsection is devoted to characterizing notions of stability and dominance in our particular
model. In the previous discussion we assumed that all locations are fished. In what follows we relax this assumption
and consider situations where locations may be dominated by sets of other locations.

The idea of instability here is that there is an agglomeration effect in some location s, creating incentives to
move out of
into s. However, the movers
are made better off, and stayers
are made worse off, so
everyone has an incentive to move into s. Sites
can exhibit either agglomeration or congestion effects in
equilibrium. If all
exhibit congestion effects, then for the equilibrium to be unstable the benefits of leaving,
must outweigh the benefits of staying when others leave,
A sufficient condition for an
equilibrium to be unstable is that at least two sites exhibit agglomeration effects. So far we have assumed an interior
solution, we now discuss corner solutions and notions of locational dominance.

At a corner equilibrium, payoffs in each site are not necessarily equal. The corner equilibrium gives rise to
notions of locational dominance. Let
If any site j is strongly dominated by any site s, then site j will not be fished in equilibrium. That is,
The result follows from the fact that any vessel in site j will always have a higher payoff if it switches to site s.

If site s strongly dominates site j, then it weakly dominates j. This result follows from the fact that
on [0, 1].

At a weakly stable interior equilibrium there appears to be an incentive to deviate into s, because
However, once vessels move into s from any
, the stayers gain higher payoff than the movers, so
there is an incentive for movers to return to
. Weak stability is a fairly strong condition, because no matter
where vessels leave, staying vessels are always better off regardless of where they are. Weak stability means there
are incentives to deviate but stronger incentives to return after deviation.

Essentially there may exist equilibria where some sites are not visited,
and those sites that are visited,
, possess an interior solution. A semi-interior solution will be stable or unstable based on Definitions 1, 2 and
7, but for and not {1, . . . , S}. Definition 8 leads to a third concept of dominance.

The point here is that a site may neither be strongly nor weakly dominated by any or all other sites individually,
but it may still be dominated by a particular stable equilibrium point. In other words, a site that is not strongly or
weakly dominated may remain unvisited in equilibrium. This is a different form of dominance than those previously
defined, so it is difficult to make direct comparisons.
3. Empirics
In the fishery economics literature the theory of congestion externalities was initially proposed by Brown (1974),
however to the best of our knowledge, empirical work has not been conducted on fisheries data. There have been a
few empirical papers that investigate congestion in the recreational demand literature (McConnell, 1977; Timmins
and Murdock, 2007). Empirical modeling of preferences in the presence of congestion externalities is challenging
because congestion, α, is endogenously determined by an agent’s selection of where to locate which is, in turn, a
function of congestion. While this endogeneity is certainly present in the equilibrium model of Section 2, the
assumption of a continuum of representative agents with zero mass greatly simplifies that analysis, and of course
parameter identification and estimation is not an issue. However, the endogeneity issue becomes the central
challenge for any empirical implementation of this equilibrium model, particularly since agents are (in reality)
discrete, have positive mass (in the distribution of agents), and have heterogeneous tastes and technology. Of course
most empirical implementations of equilibrium models of strategic behavior would suffer from these same issues, so
we are not alone. That being said, there remains a clear and strong connection between the concepts of the last
section and those of the empirics that follow.
Our empirical approach follows that of Berry et al. (1995), which, unfortunately, does not address the issue
of multiple equilibria. More recently Tamer (2003), Aradillas-Lopez and Tammer (2008) and Ciliberto and Tamer
(2009) consider empirical investigations of entry models with multiple equilibria. Tamer (2003) considers
identification and estimation of a static, bivariate entry model with multiple equilibria. Estimation follows from
restrictions on the probabilities of non-unique outcomes. Aradillas-Lopez and Tammer (2008) consider similar
models with rational behavior (replacing Nash behavior) and provide ‘‘constructive identification results that lead
naturally to consistent estimators’’. Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) consider partial identification of parameters in an
empiricalmodel of airline entry. Their econometric framework is a multiplayer generalization of Tamer (2003); it
exploits the Tamer’s restrictions on the probabilities of non-unique outcomes to bound choice probabilities which
partially identifies the models parameters. 8
Consider a vessel (fisherman) deciding among S sites, each having payoffs and costs of access equal to
Based on the game-theoretic model of Section 2, suppose that the agent’s payoff in site s is impacted by share of
the fleet at site s via the interaction function
. Following a standard random utility model, the vessel chooses site
s over all other j sites if:

8

Ultimately, our purpose is to identify point estimates of parameters in a multiplayer, multiple-choice Nash model, so none of these approaches
are wellsuited to the goals of this research. In future research partially identified models will be explored.

The site-specific error terms are observed by vessels but unobserved by the econometrician. If site s is
selected, it may be due to high expected revenues, low costs, or a high value of
We note here that the observables
and unobservable in Eq. (1) are not vessel-specific. While this is in keeping with the theoretical model of Section 2,
ultimately we incorporate vessel-specific information into the empirical model and, hence, deviate from the theory. 9
If other fishermen are aware of this unobservable desirable attribute of site s, then congestion is also likely to be
high at the site. Consequently, there is an unavoidable correlation between the share of the fleet visiting the site, ,
and unobserved site-specific attributes, This makes identification of f challenging. Bayer and Timmins (2007)
propose a two-stage instrumental variable approach to identify a monotonic That is, they let
say, in
Eq. (1) and consistently estimate
The sign of
determines if player’s strategies are purely
complements or substitutes. As discussed in Timmins and Murdock (2007), the model is similar to a static,
simultaneous-move Nash bargaining model where agents make decisions conditional on their expectations regarding
competing agents. Their model is particularly relevant in our case, since the underlying equilibrium of the spatial
distribution of economic activity allows the parameters in Eq. (1) to be estimated. However, we moderately extend
the empirical model of Bayer and Timmins (2007) by assuming that a sorting equilibrium across sites occurs each
day throughout the season. 10 Thus, we incorporate a time dimension in our estimation methodology, and the payoff
vessel i derives from visiting site s at time t is,

where

is given by the partial linear model

The matrix
contains site-specific data (e.g., revenues, bycatch, etc.),
contains information that varies
across vessels (distance traveled to arrive at the location),
(an unobservable constant) represents the baseline
payoff from visiting site s before accounting for vessel-specific information, and
is the unobservable portion of
site-specific payoff. Eq. (3) corresponds to the site-specific payoff function used to characterize equilibria in
Assumption 1. The
portion of Eq. (3) is the timevarying equivalent of and we are effectively evaluating
vessel interaction over daily equilibria in Assumption 1. This is the sense in which our theoretical model is tied to
the empirical analysis. Essentially, we estimate and using the partial linear model of Eq. (3). We may then
examine the functional form of to understand how strategic responses to congestion may change with the level of
congestion.
Each vessel maximizes its utility over spatial alternatives, given their expectations on the actions of the
others which influences
Assuming that
is distributed i.i.d. extreme value, the probability that the ith vessel
selects site s in period t is,

Then the predicted share of vessels visiting sites in period t is,

The maximum likelihood estimates

9

and

are obtained from the optimization,

In this setting it may be possible to solve a global game in the style of Karp et al. (2007) where agents receive an individual market signal,
thereby allowing for the incorporation of agent-specific observables and unobservables. This is currently being considered by the authors.
10
In the Alaskan Yellowfin Fishery during the years 2000–2004, fishing occurs on 957 unique days across 71 sites.

where are the observed equilibrium share of vessels in site s in period and
equals 1 if vessel i selects site s
11
in period t, and zero otherwise. For any estimated value of , a vector of site-and time-specific baseline payoff
estimates
is recovered that preserves the observed sorting equilibrium (i.e., preserves
in Eq. (7)). Ideally, one
could estimate a full information maximum likelihood model by plugging Eq. (3) into (2) and estimating the two
functions jointly. However this is intractable given that there are 5313
that must be estimated and that they
satisfy the equality constraint in Eq. (7). 12 Berry (1994) proposes a contraction mapping that simplifies the search
over the parameter space and guarantees that the equilibrium shares satisfy Eq. (7). For each iteration, over the
parameter space of the likelihood function, define contraction mapping
The mapping ensures that site-specific constants move toward the observed sorting equilibrium for any
. The technique is amenable to problems having large numbers of constants.
Since we assume an extreme value distribution for the error in Eq. (2), we implicitly impose Independence
from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). 13 We explored using Hausman–McFadden test of IIA, but these tests are
motivated and conducted on the basis of well-formed priors for the grouping of choice alternatives. We have no a
priori basis for forming groups of fishing locations. Admittedly, we could examine different ad hoc groupings of
sites over each of the 71 spatial locations, employing a grid-search-type approach to the test. However, we have
elected not to do this and note that many spatial choice papers fail to do so unless groupings of sites over types of
site usage or geographic organization are self-evident.
The estimation algorithm proceeds in two-stages. In the first stage Eq. (6) is maximized subject to (7) with
iterations based on (8). In the second stage, the
are treated as dependent variables in Eq. (3), and
is
estimated. In what follows the first stage is always the same, however in the second stage a variety of estimation
strategies are employed, based on different assumptions on the functional form of and on the presence of
endogeneity through
3.1 Data Description
Data for this analysis come from the Alaska Fisheries Science Center’s Observer Program Database, which contains
production information on vessels operating within the BSAI with 100% of all spatial production observed for
vessels greater than 125 ft in length and with 30% coverage for vessels less than 125 ft. The data were collected
during 2000–2004, using federal observers who are aboard each vessel while at sea and who record information on
the GIS coordinates of each fishing haul (deployment of gear), the composition of the catch and other biological
information relevant to fisheries management. Over this period there were 975 days when vessels fished. Because
we do not perfectly observe the spatial behavior of vessels less than 125 in length, we focus the analysis on only
those vessels with 100% spatial coverage. 14
Using the GIS coordinates of each haul, spatial identifications are assigned that are consistent with the
statistical reporting zones used by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game. Zones divide the BSAI into grids with
each cell’s dimension being 1/2 degree latitude by 1 degree longitude, of which there are 71 unique spatial sites
within our data set. Distances are calculated using the centroids of each cell within the grid defining the spatial sites
within the BSAI. Price data for the fishery are from the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) fish ticket
and Commercial Operator Annual Report (COAR) and represents the ex-vessel value of fish landed.
The focus is the yellowfin sole fishery operating in the BSAI, which is part of the larger head-and-gut fleet
operating in the fishery. Targeting designations are based on National Marine Fisheries Service guidelines, which
specify that a vessel is targeting yellowfin sole if more than 50% of its catch is flatfish (yellowfin sole, rock sole,
flathead sole, rex sole, etc.) and if more than 70% of that 50% consists of yellowfin sole. In addition, our analysis
focuses solely on catcher-processors in the BSAI and does not include the
value of

11
12

Given that our data are at the ‘‘haul’’ level (individual deployments of fishing gear) i is actually defined as the haul.

To focus our analysis we only look at those sites in which fishing actually takes place on a given day. We do not use a spatially balanced panel
in our estimation because there are many zero-effort sites on a given day in our data.
13
We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
14

This may cause problems for estimating congestion equilibria, as smaller boats may be more capable of ‘‘squeezing’’ into already congested
waters. Excluding them may understate crowding and overstate reactions to congestion.

smaller catcher vessels operating in the fishery. Although this may seem limiting, the 43 Vessels in our data harvest
over 80% of the annual yellowfin sole catch each year.
Table 1 has descriptive statistics for the fleet. On the average fishing cruise a vessel earns approximately
$55,400 (expressed in 2004 $’s), conducts approximately 80 hauls spaced over 21 days, visits approximately eight
uniquely different locations and visits slightly less than two sites a day. The fact that vessels often times conduct
repeated hauls (gear deployments) in the same location on a given day will be accounted for in our empirical
analysis as we differentiate between vessel and gear congestion/agglomeration.
3.2 Estimation
The traditional way to conceptualize congestion is as the number of decision makers competing in a location or
market. However, in the commercial fishing industry ‘‘gear interactions’’ are particularly important to the concept
of congestion. That is, the count of vessels in a location is important to congestion, but the frequency of deployment
of fishing gear in a location may be an equally important congestion concept. In the empirics that follow we
consider both vessel counts and gear deployments as measures of congestion. To investigate gear congestion we
treat each haul (deployment of gear) as a unique observation and estimate shares based on the total level of gear
effort in a given location. We refer to this gear congestion model as Model 1 in our discussion of the results. To
investigate vessel congestion we only use the first haul conducted by each vessel on a given day and estimate shares
based on the total number of vessels that deployed gear in a given location. We refer to this vessel congestion model
as Model 2. We compare the results of the two congestion specifications.
In Eq. (4),
the distance traveled by vessel on day from its last spatial location to
location s. This distance is a proxy for marginal costs (e.g., fuel, labor, opportunity cost), which are vessel specific. 15
Estimates of
and are recovered from Eqs. (4)–(8). The value of is −0.0280 for Model 1 and −0.0136 for
Model 2, however only Model 1’s coefficient is statistically significant. These results suggest that in general vessel
payoffs are lower at more distant sites. The specification selected for Eq. (3) is,
where
is site- and time-specific revenue (average fleet-wide catch over the last 30 days in each location in each
day multiplied by the landed price),
is the standard deviation of those revenues, and
is the expected
15

DISTANCE is the only observable in the analysis that could be constructed to vary over vessels. This is due to limitations in the variability of
the other observables once they were allocated to different spatial locations, given our predetermined definition of the spatial resolution.

bycatch (the incidental catch of non-target and non-marketable species also based on average fleet-wide catch over
the last 30 days). The parameters can be interpreted as a game-specific constants (estimated for each day) in the
sorting equilibrium model because they correspond to the temporal resolution at which we measure congestion.
What follow are several attempts to estimate
in Eq. (9). 16
As a first pass, endogeneity is ignored, so
(this assumption will be relaxed in the next section),
the interaction function is parameterized as the third order polynomial,
and Eq. (9) is estimated using OLS. 17 Parameter estimates for Models 1 and 2 are in the first two columns of Table 2
respectively, and the estimates of the interaction functions are depicted in Fig. 1. 18 Standard errors are not corrected
for any potential temporal or spatial correlations, but again we are only trying to get a sense of the curvature of
Based on our results for Models 1 and 2, the market signal
is increasing in expected revenues
decreasing in
the variability of those revenues
and increasing in the expected bycatch
These results are robust to our
specification of congestion (compare Models 1 and 2), however the positive coefficient on bycatch seems odd since
vessels tend to avoid bycatch at certain times during the fishing season, however in the final specification the
coefficient on bycatch is insignificant for both models. Fig. 1 suggests that the interaction function is monotonic in
gear and vessel shares (congestion) in Models 1 and 2 (respectively) when endogeneity is ignored across both
specifications of congestion.
Based on the assumption that
Eq. (9) can also be semi-parametrically estimated using the
partial-linear estimator of Robinson (1988). Given the assumption that
we have the following, 19

The conditional expectations are non-parametrically estimated using an arbitrarily selected Gaussian kernel
with optimal

bandwidth selection using least-squares cross validation. 20 After estimation of Eq. (11), f (α) can be estimated semiparametrically as

16

The specification could also include time-invariant location dummies, but we chose to exclude them.
A 3rd-order polynomial was selected based on F -tests. F -tests for the final IV model are presented in the sequel.
18
For brevity, we do not report the nearly one thousand game specific constants (βt ) for any of our second stage results. These constants are
17

available from the authors.
19
We thank Andres Aradillas-Lopez for the suggestion to use Robinson (1988) semi-parametric estimator.
20
The least-squares cross validation routine was coded in MATLAB using the constrained optimization routine with a lower bound of 0 and an
unconstrained upper bound. Bandwidth was selected using the interior-point algorithm in MATLAB.

The idea is that, even though endogeneity is ignored, the semiparametric estimator of
will provide a
sense of how well the parametric polynomial of Eq. (10) fits the data. The results of the semi-parametric estimation
are in the last four columns of Table 2. The first two are for Model 1 (gear) and last two for Model 2 (vessels). The
coefficients are insignificant, but the plot of the interaction function in Fig. 2 for both Model 1 (left pane) and Model
2 (right pane) appears to confirm that the interaction function is close to a third-order polynomial. In fact, the shapes
of the functions in Figs. 1 and 2 are surprisingly similar. The magnitudes are different, but the curvatures are close.
In what follows, Eq. (9) is estimated under the assumption of endogenous shares,
using both the
parametric and semiparametric model specification for Models 1 and 2.
3.3 Instrumental Variables Estimation
As pointed out by Bayer and Timmins (2007), the share of agents selecting a site,
is correlated with the error
term,
To circumvent this, they developed an instrumental variables approach for identifying
congestion/agglomeration effects that leverages the exogenous data (information on the other sites not selected) in
the model as well as the spatial and, in our case, temporal variation to obtain instruments that are correlated with
21
The logic behind using the set of instruments they propose is
share but are uncorrelated with the error term,
that the desire to fish in a given location is determined not only by the location-specific information, but also by the
relative comparison of this information with the other potential locations one may fish. Therefore, information from
other sites can be used as instruments for the share of fishermen that select a given site (Bayer and Timmins, 2007).
Introduction of non-linear
presents no additional difficulties to this identification approach (Bayer and
Timmins, 2007, footnote 18). Based on F -tests the appropriate specification for
in Eq. (10) is a cubic function
for Model 1, and a quadratic for Model 2. However, we also specify
as a cubic for Model 2 to facilitate model
comparisons. This assumption does not qualitatively alter the results (as we shall see). The F -tests for Model 1 were
as follows: linear vs. quadratic,
; linear vs. cubic,
quadratic vs. cubic,
First, Eq. (9) is estimated with the restriction
to recover estimates
. 22 Then
instrumented vessel shares are

where,

and where is the estimate from the original likelihood function in Eq. (6). Then OLS is used to estimate Eq. (9)
with
substituted for
in Eq. (10).
Results of the above procedure are in Table 3. The results for Model 1 indicate that all three curvature
parameters
are significant and imply a non-monotonic interaction, while the results for Model 2 indicate
that third-order term is insignificant. Fig. 3 depicts
for both Model 1 (left pane) and Model 2 (right pane). The
solid curves are the conditional mean of the shares and the dashed curves are the 95% upper and lower confidence
bounds, based on the standard errors in Table 3 (left two columns). For Model 1 there are two points in the curve
where the estimated
when
equals 0.3565 and when it equals 0.6066. When less than 35.65% of
vessels visit a site on a given day, there

21

Although we directly address the correlation between αst and ηst in our IV estimation, we do not explicitly investigate two other forms of
correlation within the data: serial correlation and spatial correlation. Both of these forms of correlation may be important considerations which we
plan to more formally investigate in future research.
22
In their linear setting, Timmins and Murdock (2007) impose the restriction λ2 = λ3 = 0, letting endogenous congestion enter into the first-stage
regression. Our restriction does not affect consistency of their procedure, but letting λ1 be a free parameter in our first-stage produced nonsensical
results. Our sense is that congestion endogeneity is severe in this setting, and including it in the first stage is= possibly biasing our results.

are agglomeration effects, but, when 35.65% to 60.66% of vessels visit, there are congestion effects. Finally, when
is beyond 60.66%, vessels will, again, agglomerate. 23 For Model 2 the two inflection points are when gear
deployment shares,
, equals 0.3573 and 1.0349, the latter lying outside of the range of feasible values for
and
outside the x-axis in the second panel of Fig. 3. If one were to set the third-order term equal to zero, due to its
statistical insignificance, the feasible inflection point is then 0.2656.
Robinson’s (1988) semi-parametric estimator of
using the instrumented shares
, generates very
similar results to the parametric model. These results are in the last four columns of Table 3. The coefficients on the
revenues
and its standard deviation
are statistically significant at conventional levels for both Models 1 and
2, and the coefficient on bycatch
is not. Fig. 4 depicts the semi-parametric interaction function using
instrumented shares for both Model 1 (left pane) and 2 (right pane). A cubic function was fit to the both the data for
Model 1 (solid curve in the left pane) and Model 2 (dashed curve in the right pane) using MATLAB’s curve fitting
routine. Also, a quadratic function was fit to Model 2 (solid curve in right pane), because the third-order term of the
23

While it is technically an inconsistent estimation procedure due to the nonlinearity of f , estimation of the semi-parametric model using
instrumented (vs. actual) shares produces a similarly shaped, non-monotonic function that is not presented here.

polynomial in the parametric model was insignificant (Column 2 in Table 3). Calculating the inflection points for
the semi-parametric model using instrumented shares, Fig. 4 shows that agglomeration is present up until the shares
equal to 0.2049 in Model 1 and 0.1965 in Model 2 (0.2077 if using the quadratic function for Model 2). Beyond this
point, sites exhibit congestion

until the shares reach 0.5181 in Model 1 and 0.7865 on Model 2, at which point agglomeration again arises.
Fig. 5 shows the distribution of
resulting from the sorting equilibria for both Models 1 (left pane) and 2
(right pane). For parametric Model 1 a majority of the distributional mass, approximately 95%, lies below the initial
inflection point of the parametric cubic function (0.3565) and only 0.23% of the mass lies above the second
inflection point (0.6066). For the non-parametric Model 1 approximately 24% of the mass lies above the initial
inflection point of 0.2049 and only 0.45% lies above the second inflection point (0.5181). Combined these results
suggest that agglomeration effects dominate for Model 1 with between approximately 5% and 24% of the data
exhibiting congestion. For Model 2 a similar pattern arises. Approximately 95% of the distributional mass lies below
the initial parametric inflection point of 0.3573 while approximately 70% lies below the initial semi-parametric
inflection point of 0.1965. Furthermore, none of the distributional mass lies above the second non-parametric
inflection point of 0.7865. Therefore, as was the case with Model 1, vessel agglomeration dominates the data, with
congestion observed for approximately 5%–30% of the data, depending on the whether or not one focuses on the
parametric or semi-parametric results.
Although the last segment of behavior for Model 1 (that lying the right of the second parametric or nonparametric inflection points in the left pane of Figs. 3 and 4, respectively) is inconsistent with a (quasi-) concave
interaction function, the curve estimates in this region are based on relatively few observations for which crowding

was particularly intense. Consequently, the true interaction function may still be (quasi-) concave. 24 Alternatively,
these extreme observations could be the result of complex herding behavior (Bikchandani et al., 1992) in which the
private vessel’s signal of stock abundance is outweighed by the public information provided by the observed
behavior of the other vessels. However, private information is inconsistent with our complete information model.
In summary, the empirical results suggest a non-monotonic interaction function. Therefore, both
agglomeration and congestion effects are present in the strategic behavior of vessels in the yellowfin sole fishery.
There are a number of reasons why vessels

may wish to fish in regions where other vessels are located. Safety was mentioned in the introduction as a potential
motivation for agglomeration. Additionally, if vessels tend to fish in the same regions, it reduces their exposure to
the economic risk of deviating from the behavior of everyone else in the fishery and potentially earning less relative
to others in the fleet. Therefore, agglomeration is consistent with risk-adverse spatial fishing behavior. 25 In addition,
the concave portion of
suggests that the benefits of agglomeration are eventually mitigated. This may be
consistent with the notion of serial depletion in fisheries. Serial depletion arises when repetitive fishing in a site
lowers catch on subsequent hauls. Therefore, although there are agglomeration effects, they may be diminishing,
because too many fish are likely to be taken.
4. Conclusions
This research expands the global game with strategic substitutes and complements of Karp et al. (2007) to a spatial
decision model of where to harvest a resource when non-monotonic congestion and agglomeration effects may be
present. The theoretical game presented is empirically investigated using data from the BSAI flatfish fishery to
determine the extent of strategic substitutes and complements present. Result suggest non-monotonicity of the
interaction function. Focusing only on models where we instrument the share of activity in each location and time
period, our parametric results suggest that an agglomeration effect arises in the BSAI flatfish fisherywhen the share
of vessel/gear activity is below approximately 36%, but beyond this point a congestion effect appears up to
approximately 61%, at which point the agglomeration effect once again arises (note that the second inflection point
for Model 2 lies outside of 100% and is infeasible). This said, it is important to note that only rarely is it the case
that observed share of activity exceeds approximately 61% in the data (see Fig. 5). Our non-parametric results
indicate that agglomeration effects are not as persistent as is implied by our parametric model; agglomeration effects
exists only until the share of activity reaches 20%. Beyond 20%, a congestion effect exists until the share of activity
reaches about 52% (79% for Model 2). However, as was the case with our parametric model, very little of the
shares’ distributional mass lies beyond the 52% share point, indicating that the reappearance of the agglomeration
24

Particularly for the non-parametric Model 1 in the left pane of Fig. 4. One could also imagine that curve estimates near the right-most
boundary of the support are naturally more biased than those on the interior of the support.
25
Knowing that other vessels are fishing in a location may also provide a positive signal on the abundance of fish within that region, but this
argument is not consistent with our model, since this is less of a response to crowding and more of a response to market signal. If this were true it
would suggest the market signal is observed with uncertainty.

effect occurs for only a small portion of the data (very infrequently). Therefore, our overall results (both parametric
and non-parametric) indicate that the interaction function is nonmonotonic in agglomeration/congestion in this
fishery and is, perhaps, (quasi-) concave.
Although this research has improved our understanding of spatial choice theory and the empirical
characterization of sorting equilibrium modeling, it does leave a number of unanswered questions which will be
investigated in future research. One of the more important unanswered questions is how might one precisely
characterize equilibria within an empirical model with 71 locational choices? Given the structure of the empirical
model, it is not feasible to characterize all the equilibria in the data. Finding a practical way to do this for all sites in
the analysis might strengthen the connection between the theory and the empirics. Furthermore, a more complete
understanding of these equilibria would inform resource management policy, because regulations based on spatial
location are commonly enacted in many US fisheries. However, as previously mentioned, this may require a
generalization of the theory to the case where ‘‘not fishing’’ is a possible action.
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